Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission

April 24, 2013 Commission Meeting Video

joelperkins — Fri, 26 Apr 2013 05:13:43 +0000

PENDING ADVISORY OPINION REQUEST: 2013-02 Whether an incumbent public official, who is undecided about seeking re-election in his or her election year, and who has taken no steps to either seek nomination for election or re-election, is required to file the March 31 Campaign Contribution Disclosure Report.

joelperkins — Mon, 01 Apr 2013 04:22:12 +0000

Advisory Opinion C.F.C. 2013-02 – DRAFT RESPONSE The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission (the “Commission”) has received this request for advisory opinion from Charles J. King, the Clerk and Qualifying Officer of Town of Riverside, Georgia. The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act (the “Act”) provides that candidates or campaign committees that accept contributions, make expenditures designed to bring about the nomination or election of a candidate, or have filed a declaration of intent to accept campaign contributions (“DOI”) must file certain campaign disclosure reports. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-76(a). A “candidate” is defined by the Act as “an individual who seeks nomination for election or election to any public office, whether or not such an individual is elected….” See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-3(4). A person can be deemed “to seek nomination or election” several different ways. Id. For example, if a person has taken necessary action to qualify for nomination or election, he or she is deemed to seek nomination or election. Id. A person is also deemed to seek nomination or election if he or she has received any contributions or made any expenditures in pursuit of such nomination or election. Id. Likewise, a person is to seek nomination or election if he or she has given consent for his or her campaign committee to receive contributions or make expenditures. Id. The Act’s definition of candidate makes clear that a person does not necessarily have to qualify for nomination or election to be deemed a candidate. Indeed, a person may begin receiving campaign contributions before taking action to qualify for nomination or election, so long as that person has filed with the Commission a DOI. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-30(g). The Commission does not require an incumbent to file a new DOI to accept campaign contributions for the office currently held prior to formally qualifying to seek re-election. Thus, because the DOI is in effect until the incumbent vacates his or her office, such an incumbent is permitted to accept campaign contributions prior to formally qualifying. Accordingly, the Commission finds that unless an incumbent in an election year has formally withdrawn the DOI on file with the Commission or is seeking a different office, then the DOI on file is still in effect. Thus, the incumbent must file the March 31 Campaign Contribution Disclosure Report.

PENDING ADIVISORY OPINION REQUEST: 2013-01 Whether a consultant who assists a local government in the preparation of a proposal for a grant from the state government, advocates for the award of the grant, and accepts a small percentage of the grant award as compensation is in violation of the prohibition on contingent fees for lobbying under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-76(a), where there is no intergovernmental agreement or other “contract” between the local government and any state agency.

gaethics — Thu, 28 Mar 2013 16:04:56 +0000

Advisory Opinion C.F.C. 2013-01 – DRAFT RESPONSE The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission (the “Commission”) has received this request for advisory opinion from the law firm of Holland & Knight LLP. The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act (the “Act”) provides that No lobbyist shall be employed for compensation contingent, in whole or in part, upon the passage or defeat of any legislation, upon the adoption or decision not to adopt any state agency rule or regulation, or upon the granting or awarding of any state contract. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-76(a). A person is deemed a lobbyist under the Act in a number of alternative situations. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-70(5). If a person falls within any of those enumerated definitions, then that person must register with the Commission as a lobbyist. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-71(a)(1). Under the Act, once a person is deemed and registered as a lobbyist, he or she is prohibited from being employed on a contingent fee basis upon the granting or awarding of any state contract. Code Section 21-5-76(a) does not provide for any exceptions to this prohibition depending upon the scope of the lobbyist’s engagement. Thus, a person cannot shed the lobbyist mantel by claiming his or her work is a consulting job not within the scope of his or her lobbying activities. The Act does not define the word “state contract.” Likewise, the Act does not provide a definition of the term “grant.” While no Georgia court has directly addressed the question of whether a grant is a contract, a review of federal law reveals that grant agreements are routinely deemed “contracts.” See, e.g., Knight v. U.S., 52 Fed. Cl. 243, 251 (2002)(“A grant agreement is an enforceable contract in this court.”); Heart of Valley Metropolitan Sewage Dist. V. U.S. E.P.A., 532 F. Supp. 314, 317 (E.D. Wis. 1981)(“[S]uch a grant agreement is a contract enforceable in the Court of Claims.”); 42 U.S.C. § 5908(m)(2)(“[T]he term ‘contract’ means any contract, grant, agreement….”); Ozdemir v. U.S., 89 Fed. Cl. 631, 639 (2009)(‘[T]he word ‘contract’ encompasses a wide range of formal agreements, including [grants]….”); County of Suffolk, N.Y. v. U.S., 19 Cl. Ct. 295, 300 (1990)(characterizing dispute related to two federal grant agreements as a breach of contract action). But see City of Manassas Park v. U.S., 224 Ct. Cl. 515, 521 (1980)(holding claim related to grant agreement not contractual); Trauma Serv. Group, Ltd. v. U.S., 33 Fed. Cl. 426, 429 (1995)(“Not every agreement is a contract.”). In light of this persuasive authority, the Commission finds that a grant can be a state contract as the term is used in O.C.G.A. § 21-5-76(a). But the Commission does not find that every grant is such a contract. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the Act does not prevent a consultant who is not a lobbyist from being employed on a contingent fee basis upon the granting or awarding of any state contract. The Commission finds, however, that a consultant who is a lobbyist and who assists a local government in the preparation of a proposal for a grant from the state government, advocates for the award of the grant, and accepts a small percentage of the grant award as compensation could be in violation of the prohibition on contingent fees for lobbying under O.C.G.A. § 21-5-76(a). Because the question of whether a grant agreement is a state contract is factual and must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the Commission finds that it cannot offer a bright line test in response to the question presented.

November 16, 2012 Commission Meeting Video

chrislafay — Thu, 24 Jan 2013 14:53:05 +0000

Commission Minutes Posted for November 16, 2012 ( )

gaethics — Tue, 20 Nov 2012 17:03:34 +0000

Commission Meeting Scheduled for November 16, 2012

gaethics — Fri, 02 Nov 2012 21:06:23 +0000

Paul D. Coverdell Legislative Office Building
Room 515
18 Capitol Square SW, Atlanta, GA 30334

ADIVISORY OPINION NO 2012-03 Summary of Request From: Commission Staff The Advisory Opinion Request seeks clarification regarding the proper application of the Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act to factual situations involving campaign expenditures for attorney’s fees associated with the defense of a candidate for statewide office. Specifically, the request seeks additional guidance from the Commission regarding the treatment of legal fees paid from a campaign for a Georgia candidate for legal fees from a federal investigation that arose from conduct that occurred when the candidate was in federal office.

gaethics — Mon, 15 Oct 2012 16:25:07 +0000

GEORGIA GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE COMMISSION ADVISORY OPINION C.F.C. 2012-03 AND C.F.C 2012-05 The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission (the “Commission”) has received the following requests for advisory opinion from the Commission staff (Request No. 2012-03) and McKenna Long & Aldridge (Request No. 2012-05). Because these requests cover the same issues, the Commission has combined them into one advisory opinion. QUESTION PRESENTED – NO. 2012-03 Whether a candidate for a Georgia elected office may expend campaign funds from the Georgia campaign for legal fees arising from a federal investigation of conduct that occurred when the candidate was in federal office. QUESTION PRESENTED – NO. 2012-05 What is the appropriate methodology for evaluating the acceptability of attorney fee expenditures by the state campaign committee of a current or past federal office holder when such costs are clearly made in connection with the candidate’s active campaign for state office, but also bear some relationship to the candidate’s current or past federal position? How should a state campaign committee assess the treatment of particular attorney fee expenditures in factual scenarios where the legal services provided fundamentally relate to the candidate’s run for state elective office, but cannot be cast in a light that is wholly segregated from the candidate’s present or former federal office? ADVISORY OPINION The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Act (the “Act”) provides that Contributions to a candidate…shall be utilized only to defray ordinary and necessary expenses...incurred in connection with such candidate’s campaign for elective office…. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-33(a). Under Article 1, the Act defines “ordinary and necessary expenses” as including, but not limited to Expenditures made during the reporting period for office costs and rent, lodging, equipment, travel, advertising, postage, staff salaries, consultants, file storage, polling, special events, volunteers, reimbursements to volunteers, repayment of any loans received except as restricted under subsection (i) of Code Section 21-5-41, contributions to nonprofit organizations, and flowers for special occasions, which shall include, but are not limited to, birthdays and funerals, and all other expenditures contemplated in Code Section 21-5-33. See O.C.G.A. § 21-5-3(18). While legal fees are not explicitly listed in the Act’s definition of ordinary and necessary expenses, there are instances where such expenditures could be an “ordinary and necessary expense” in connection with a candidate’s campaign for office. There may also be instances where legal fees would not be an “ordinary and necessary expense” in connection with a candidate’s campaign for office. The Commission finds that the acceptability of attorney fee expenditures by a state campaign committee of a current or past federal office holder is a fact-specific inquiry that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Commission, however, holds that such attorney fee expenditures must be connected to and in furtherance of the campaign. If a complaint is made regarding the acceptability of attorney fee expenditures, a candidate must make a full disclosure to the Commission so that an appropriate decision can be made after a full investigation of the facts. Prepared by Jonathan Hawkins. November 16, 2012. ADOPTED AT NOVEMBER 16, 2012 COMMISSION MEETING

Commission Minutes Posted for 12/04/2008 ( )

gaethics — Wed, 22 Aug 2012 12:55:39 +0000

July 23, 2012 Commission Meeting Video

gaethics — Thu, 26 Jul 2012 16:18:46 +0000

Commission Minutes Posted for July 23, 2012 ( Summary )

gaethics — Wed, 25 Jul 2012 17:23:21 +0000